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THE MAINTENANCE OF ETHNIC IDENTITY 
IN CATALONIAI 
Oriol Pi-Sunyer 
University of Massachusetts 
I 
Ethnic groups--nationalities is perhaps a better term--preceded the 
nation-state historically, and interethnic relations antedate international 
relations. In the medieval world, a multiplicity of languages, dialects, 
and local cultural traditions were taken for granted and caused little 
comment; in no way were they incompatible with the ties of personal 
allegiance which peasant owed to lord and lord to king. Regional rights 
and regional legal structures were, at least ideally, recognized and 
protected by the crown. Pluralism was the rule rather than the exception. 
With respect to language, diversity was seen as falling squarely 
wi thin the natural order : it might be unfortunate that men spoke different 
tongues, but this was attributed to human imperfection and perversity. 
This is not to imply an absence of ethnic conflict, but apart from 
the inhabitants of frontier regions and those individuals whose profess-
ions involved travel, very few men were in a position to experience 
protracted contact with different ethnic groups. Interethnic contact 
was certainly limited, and interethnic conflict was seldom elevated to 
a political cause. 
III 
In the contemporary Western world, however, the nation~state has 
become the structure to which the individual is expected to give his 
undivided allegiance. From the Renaissance to the present, the history 
of Europe suggests that the national directing elites distrust plural-
ism and view the monoethnic state as the ideal goal. With only a little 
exaggeration, post-medieval political philosophy could well be para~ 
2 phrased as one state, one language, one culture. It is vital to 
recognize that this is something of a constant. Although the monoethnic 
\' ideal has its origins in the royal absolutism of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, monarchists and republicans, liberals and con-
servatives, traditionalists and rationalists, all agreed on the virtues 
of a strong centralized state. The French Revolution did more to com~ 
bat regionalism, branded in its linguistic aspects with the disparaging 
label of "patois" (from Poi tiers in the Limousin), than all the royal 
governments of the ancien regime. 
Modern political ideologies appear late on the scene and have been 
superimposed on an existing mosaic of cultural and linguistic diversity. 
It is somewhat paradoxical that the same forces which contributed so 
much to the molding of conscious nationality at the center-~the erosion 
of traditional society, social and economic change, and the displacement 
of traditional elites by new middle sectors--also transformed the old 
ties of language, institutions, residence, and community, into aspira-
tions for distinct regional identities. Paradoxical, perhaps, but none 
the less understandable, since the periphery and the center were in-
fluenced by much the same philosophies, read the same tracts, and 
stirred to similar symbols. As Fishman (1967:94) has noted: 
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Here we find a consciousness of national history, 
with its heroes and martyrs and national missions, 
national grievances, national ideals. Here we find 
a distinction between religion and nationality , 
even when everyone (or almost everyone) is of the 
same religion (or irreligion). Here we find pride 
in national literature with its poets and novelists 
and with its literary schools, periods and styles. 
Here we find a consciousness of national language, 
with its avowed beauty, subtlety and precision. 
Language ... becomes something to love, to fight for, 
to live for, to die for; something to safeguard, to 
develop, to enrich . ... 
The difference lies in the frame of reference. The nationalism of 
ethnic communities pits itself against the weight and power of the state; 
nationalism at the center is for the most part forged in the fires of 
foreign wars and the pow-er struggles of international relations. These 
similarities highlight an essential truth: there is nothing archaic or 
atavistic in the evolution of ethnic-regional demands. In fact, a good 
case can be made that in Europe modern regionalism is to a substantial 
degree a postindustrial phenomenon (Cruells 1969:9). Certainly the re-
cognition of ethnicity and language consciousness has tended to follow 
the disintegration of traditional society, however much it may look to 
the past for charters of validation (Huntington 1968; Silvert 1963). 
Manifestations of this order may strike the casual observer as 
somewhat Quaint (or even dangerously misguided) at a time when national-
ism is often dismissed as an aberration of less enlightened times. 
However, even the most cursory examination of third world politics, 
minority aspirations in the United States, and conditions in present-day 
Europe, indicate that the tides of nationalism continue to run very 
strong. In fact, not a few European ethnic communities regard them-
selves as victims of a form of internal colonialism. That the world 
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at large has generally been slow to see matters in quite this light is 
at least in part attributable to the fact that many states have minor-
ity problems of their own. Anticolonialism of the traditional type 
directs attention to overseas dependencies (or spheres of influence) 
and allows governments, including many with anti-minority policies, to 
reap propaganda benefits in the current world political situation. Sup-
port, even of a moral and non·-material nature, of ethnic enclaves within 
the political borders of another state is an enterprise that few govern-
ments are willing to undertake. 
For these reasons, within-country interethnic conflict in Europe 
has enjoyed low visibility. But this is much less true today than it 
was a few years ago. Just at B. time when Europe is witnessing a decay 
of traditional nationalism and frontiers are increasingly regarded as 
vestiges of the past (the II age of mass consumption" is in part respon-
sible for these changes), there is reawakening in various European 
states of internal regional and national rivalries and aspirations. We 
see this in Ulster and in the hostility between Flemings and Walloons 
in Belgium; the threat of Slovak secession helped the Russians to crush 
Czech resistance in 1968; Cyprus is a land divided; in Yugoslavia the 
Croats still fear Serbian imperialism; the Bretons and other French 
minorities are uneasy under the control of Paris. It would seem that 
the winds of change in Europe are favoring both integration on the 
grand scale and the reemergence of a localism that has in many cases 
remained dormant for the better part of a century (Fontaine 1971). 
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II 
Catalan regionalism and the cultural and psychological mechanisms 
which Catalans use to maintain identity and cultural integrity are to a 
certain degree type phenomena which can be duplicated among other Span-
ish minorities as well as elsewhere in Europe. These situational and 
functional parallels have not gone unnoticed in Catalonia (Porcel 1970a), 
but there remain factors, some longstanding, others more recent, that 
are peculiar to the region and its history. 
Catalans are concentrated in the northeastern triangle of the 
Iberian peninsula and the adjoining French region of Roussillon. Cata-
lans in Spain number some six million inhabitants in a total population 
of thirty-three million . Given that the national census (Insti tuto 
Nacional de Estadlstica, or INE) does not collect information on lin-
guistic affiliation or cross-tabulate data on place of birth and place 
of residence, the figures for Catalan speakers which are to be found in 
the literature must be regarded as informed estimates (Melia 1970:79-80; 
Maluquer 196 5 : 135-136; Moll 1968 ).3 Six million, or something close to 
it, is not an insignificant linguistic bloc (on the order of Swedish or 
Bulgarian) but it still constitutes very much of a minority within the 
Spani sh tot al.I 
Industrialization is old in the region. The outlines of an indus-
trial society, based originally on textiles, can be discerned as early 
as the latter part of the eighteenth century. By 1850, Catalonia was 
experiencing a local variant of the industrial revolution (Vicens Vives 
1969: 147-148 ). Today, Catalonia remains the leading industrial region 
of Spain, although the disparities between zones of early industrial-
ization (the Basque lands and Catalonia) and the rest of the country are 
shrinking. 
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The early development of' a modern industrial base in Catalonia is 
a f'actor of' some signif'icance. In many parts of' Europe regional senti-
ments have been linked to conditions of' economic deprivation and general 
underdevelopment. Catalonia, however, is the opposite to an underdevel-
oped zone. One consequence of' this is that the "brain drain" which has 
attended provincialization in other countries--the migration of' the 
skilled and the educated to national capitals and other centers of' de-
velopment and employment--is not a major problem in the region. The 
middle class is substantial and autochthonous, while Barcelona, the 
regional capital, is f'ullymetropolitan, demographically and otherwise 
(Saez Buesa 1968: Alzina Caules 1966). 
Spain, as Juan Linz (1966:270) has observed, is a land of' great 
internal heterogeneity, not only of' the ethnic-regional variety, but 
also with respect to social composition, levels of' development, and the 
values and attitudes of' its constituent regions and sectors. In the 
taxonomy that Linz (1966:289) proposes, Catalonia f'alls into the cate-
gory of' "Bourgeois Spain": 
an area characterized by a low proportion of' un-
skilled workers--f'ew in the countryside and not 
too many in the cities--but with a sUf'f'icient 
number of' workers to reduce the proportion of' 
those in nonmanual, that is, middle class, oc-
cupations in the cities and towns. In it 
businessmen, managers, technicians, salesmen, 
and white collar employees constitute a sig-
nif'icant part of' the middle class. 
Working-class institutions, including trade unions and similar 
associations, have a history of' several generations, the f'irst legal 
trade unions and mutual aid societies in Spain having been organized 
by Catalan textile workers in 1840 (Izard 1970: 62). By 1917 almost 
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30,000 workers in the Barcelona area were enrolled in a variety of 
trade unions, cooperatives, and mutual aid societies (Jutglar 1966). 
The urban social structure of Catalonia is modern in the sense 
that both its elites and working classes are very much products of the 
transformations that accompanied industrialization. The rural pattern 
is different, but again somewhat atypical for the Mediterranean. Rural 
aristocracies were never as firmly entrenched in Catalonia (and other 
northern regions of Spain) as they were in the rest of the country. Thus, 
two features typical of southern Spain, the concentration of rural pro-
perty in a very few large estates and the presence of agrotowns inhabited 
by masses of landless laborers, are singularly absent (Malefakis 1910: 
93-130) . 
If one of the underlying problems in Spain is lack of national in-
tegration due to disparities in regional development, a somewhat similar 
cleavage has characterized urban-rural articulation in Catalonia. His-
torically, peasants have felt threatened by a variety of forces emanating 
from the city: the power of expanding capitalism, the radical political 
philosophies of the urban proletariat, and the cultural paternalism of 
the intellectuals. Catalan peasants share with Catalan townsmen a sus-
picion of state centralization, but for the peasant, the dangers from 
the center are not the only ones (Hansen 1969). 
It would appear that on a variety of counts the cultural config-
urations of the region do not easily fit recognized categories of class-
ification. Catalans, and perhaps most fervently Catalan intellectuals, 
regard themselves as a Mediterranean people, perhaps in counterpoise to 
the essentially inland Castilians. Historically, the fortunes of 
117 
Catalonia and related principalities (jointly the Kingdom of Aragon) 
were linked to trans-Mediterranean trade and political and military 
influence extending as far east as Sicily and Greece. Catalan med-
ieval high culture had its closest affinities with Provence and Aquit-
aine. The climatic regime of coastal Catalonia and the arboreal and 
field crops grown within this zone are clearly Mediterranean. 
Nevertheless, some scholars classifY contemporary Catalonia as a 
non-Mediterranean region (Pitkin 1963: 120). Perhaps this is due to 
a perception of Mediterranean societies as somewhat akin to Sjoberg's 
(1960) pre-industrial urban-oriented polities: rigidly hierarchial, 
tradi tional , administratively centralized, personalistic, and needless 
to say, maintained on the surpluses skimmed from a subordinate pea-
santry (Morris 1968: 39-61). A social and cultural entity that is 
both "Mediterranean" and "developed" is apparently difficult to con-
ceptualize, almost, in fact, a contradiction in terms. 
Be this as it may, it is perfectly true that in many respects the 
social structure of Catalonia finds its closest parallels in Western 
Europe, and within Spain, the Basque Country. Systems of patronage, 
dyadic relations, and other interpersonal networks are important, as 
they are in other Mediterranean lands. Much less evident is the em-
phasis on codes of honor and shame (Peristiany 1966), a system of 
values that has been linked to a paucity of institutional ties and the 
compensatory development of family solidarity (Schneider 1971). Not 
that family and kin are without importance in Catalonia, but rather 
that organizational problems are resolved in a variety of ways, of 
which kin-based structures is only one. 
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Given the frame of reference we have developed, Catalan nation-
alism must bridge the interests of diverse groups. Ideally, it should 
appeal not only to the bourgeoisie, but also to the industrial working 
classes and to a basically conservative peasantry. The presence of 
class alignments add an extra dimension to what would otherwise be a 
simple dichotomy between the state and the region, the center and the 
periphery. 
Also, one cannot escape the impression that Catalans are too prone 
to dismiss the potential "Ulster" in their midst, the very substantial 
non-Catalan working-class and lower-class enclaves of Castilian-speaking 
immigrants and their descendants. 4 The argument that this minority 
within a minority can, given the right conditions, be assimilated with 
few problems smacks of wishful thinking and is not borne out by similar 
historical cases (Kloss 1967). 
Finally, any appraisal of Catalan society must take into account 
the fact that the region is something of a developed enclave within a 
largely semi developed country. That this situation colors the perception 
of Catalans and acts as a further point of friction between Catalans and 
non-Catalans cannot be doubted. The truth of the matter is that Catalans 
engage in the same type of stereotyping, indulge in the same sort of 
harsh judgement, with respect to Spaniards from underdeveloped provinces, 
as the inhabitants of Lombardy reserve for Sicilians and other southern 
Italians. In much the same way as the Milanese look across the Alps to 
Lyon and South Germany, the Catalan middle classes claim a greater 
affinity with trans-Pyrenean Europe than with Extremadura and Andalusla. 
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That the economic prosperity of Catalonia has in substantial degree 
been gained by the importation of cheap labor is recognized by only 
a minority of Catalans. 
III 
It may be said that for Catalans language is the prime symbol of 
group membership and the clearest line of demarcation separating them 
from other Spaniards. From the other side of the linguistic fence, 
Catalan is a constant reminder of regional particularism. One can 
understand, therefore, why Catalan and its uses, the efforts made to 
nurture it in What continues to be a largely hostile environment, and 
its prospects for the future, remain matters of deep concern. 
Today, most Catalans, certainly most Catalan intellectuals, would 
agree that the language is in deep crisis, that the odds are heavy, 
and the struggle is bound to be difficult. These fears find expression 
in the words of a Catalan linguist: 
We have always said that the countryside is our 
reserve, but today it is very undermined by tele-
vision, a medium which is very influential ... I 
know small children who are just beginning to 
talk who learn many of their first words from 
television. If it were not that we now again 
have books in Catalan, that the records have 
helped us so much, that everyday the educational 
levels are rising, I would see things as very 
hopeless. Matters have come very close, but I 
believe that it is not too late. 
(Porcel 1970b:2l) 
Television, of course, is in Castilian. The reference to records con-
cerns the current nova can~o (new song) movement. Opinions of the same 
type have been voiced by informants. According to one young pro-
fessional : 
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Even the best intentioned non-Catalans are apt 
to chide us for what they regard as our stubborn-
ness. We are told that the use of a minority 
language breeds a ghetto mentality and a ghetto 
culture. Some say that we are going against the 
times, that to be burdened by a minority language 
is a luxury we can ill afford. Other observers 
sing the praises of bilingualism, but what they 
generally mean is that we should be fluent in 
Castilian. Actually, we are already bilingual in 
a rather special sense: most of us read and write 
Castilian considerably better that we do Catalan; 
most of us speak Catalan better than we do Castilian. 
Believe me, it is not always a very comfortable 
situation. 
This fear of language loss is not without historical precedent. We 
would not claim that the events of the past influence the current percep-
tion of all speakers of Catalan, but for what we may call the literate 
members of a literate society, history offers models that are readily 
at hand. In the middle ages Catalan was the language of the peasantry, 
but flourished also as a major court and literary language. In short, 
while there were discernible differences between "common" and "polite" 
speech (as well as local dialectal differences), all segments of society 
spoke the same basic language. 
Late in the fifteenth century the Catalan language entered a long 
period of decline which was to last until the second half of the nine-
teenth century. The factors responsible were many and need not be exam-
ined in detail. They included catastrophic wars and a series of internal 
calamities, both social and economic. To some degree these were events 
peculiar to the region, while in part they also reflected a more general 
decline in Mediterranean principalities (RegIa 1966). 
In 1469 Ferdinand, heir to the throne of Aragon, married Isabella, 
the heiress of Castile. The union of the two crowns resulted in a shift 
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in the center of political gravity. In the following centuries, the 
Kingdom of Aragon underwent changes which transformed an important 
Mediterranean state into a dependent principality and finally into a 
cluster of Spanish provinces. 
The Catalan directing classes, in particular the higher aristo-
cracy, adjusted to this change by becoming monolingually Castilian, or 
more commonly, applying a diglossic formula (Ferguson 1959; Fishman 
1967; Vallverdu 1970b; Badia i Margarit 1964: 135-148). Catalan might 
be retained for intimate and personal contexts--the family correspon-
dence of the Borgias is written in Catalan--but Castilian was reserved 
for serious events and important occasions. 
The emergence of Spain as a world power, including her initial 
dominant role in the New World, coincided with a florescence in Spanish 
letters, a factor which could not but influence the prestige of the 
Castilian language. The evidence indicates that it was these determin-
ants and influences, rather than conscious state policies, which by 
default left the peasantry as the chief guardians of the Catalan lan-
guage. The realization that in centuries past the elites rather willing-
ly (or at least without much evident resistance) discarded their 
linguistic patrimony continues to haunt educated Catalans. 
The industrialization of Catalonia ushered in a period of cultural 
and linguistic renaissance, La Renaixen~a. Initially a movement concerned 
with literary revival and the formulation of modern grammatical and 
orthographic rules, it merged in due course with Catalanisme, a more con~ 
sciously political philosophy which drew support and momentum from the 
rising bourgeoisie. Such efforts at cultural revitalization linked with 
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a growing political awareness and nationalist aspirations were not 
unusual for the Europe of the period. In common with most nineteenth 
century nationalist movements, Catalanisme was basically conservati ve-
reformist in orientation; it certainly did not emphasize social and 
political solutions of a radical nature (Sole-Tura 1967). Stress was 
placed on the reacquisition of some degree of local autonomy and the 
value of the local language and local institutions. We may take as 
representative of the demands of the period a petition forwarded by a 
commission of Catalan notables to Alfonso XII in 1885: 
What we desire ,Sir, is that in Spain there be 
implemented an adequate regional system ... 
similar to those found in the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, Germany, and the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain; a system already followed in 
Spain in the years of our greatness. We wish 
this not only for Catalonia but for all the 
other provinces of Spain ... Our administrative 
structures have been destroyed ... We cannot use 
our language except in the home and in familiar 
conversation ... strong attempts are being made 
to destroy, or at least weaken, our civil rights, 
which are the basic foundation of the robust and 
moral Catalan family and of our property .... 
(Quoted by Jutglar 1969:177) 
However, by the early decades of the twentieth century, Catalanisme 
had sufficiently broadened its base of participation to include substan-
tial segments of the industrial working class and the peasantry. A 
number of political parties covering the spectrum from conservative to 
left-of-center subscribed to a core of basic demands, a situation made 
easier by the fact that tests of ideological purity were never entrenched 
as part of the Catalanist philosophy. Catalanisme could, and did, shelter 
such_ di verse groups as conservative businessmen, middle-class professionals 
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and intellectuals, socialist workers, and peasant smallholders. 5 Some 
political parties were frankly regionalist in orientation, but no single 
party was in the position of being able to claim that it represented the 
interest of everyone within the region. 
This is not to deny that there was a good deal of factionalism in 
the Catalonia of the nineteen twenties and the nineteen thirties. As in 
the rest of Spain, these were years of strife and civil war. What may 
be termed the Catalan coalition was splintered under the stresses of 
conflicting p01itical philosophies and the pressures of the Civil War, 
but not before the four Catalan provinces had experienced limited home 
rule and the opportunity to exercise cultural autonomy within the frame-
work of the Spanish Republic. 
The Republican defeat in the Civil War was followed by a period of 
political, cultural, and linguistic repression. The Catalan language 
press, which numbered 400 periodicals of all political shades in 1930, 
was closed down; the use of Catalan in the schools and the university 
was proscribed; all official business had again to be transacted in 
Castilian. It is not necessary to claim that the years of the Republic 
represent some kind of golden age for the people of Catalonia; suffi-
cient that many Catalans are of the opinion that the Republican experi-
ment pointed the way to a better fUture, although a great number of 
important problems remained to be resolved. 
All such hopes appeared to collapse with the Republican defeat of 
1939. The Catalonia of the early seventies is certainly not the same 
as the Catalonia of the early forties. Pressures have been eased and 
the physical conditions of life have improved for sUbstantial segments 
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of the population. There is still no Catalan language press (with the 
exception of a few magazines), but on the other hand a recent catalogue 
of Catalan books in print (INLE 1969) numbers over 4,000 titles; tele-
vision and radio remain virtually monolingual, but records of Catalan 
music, including modern "protest" works, enjoy a brisk trade. Education 
at all levels is conducted in Castilian, although a new educational law 
currently under consideration includes provisions for the use of regional 
languages in the schools. Censorship of the written word has relaxed, but 
remains as a background threat. It need hardly be pointed out that no 
formal political opposition is permitted in Catalonia, or elsewhere in 
Spain, and that stringent limitations are placed on assembly and the 
activities of political groups and other associations. 
This is not to say that some outlets cannot be found for cultural-
political expression. Given the current restrictions, the usual tech-
nique is to utilize whatever loopholes are to be found in the legal 
structure and make the best possible use of a limited range of institu-
tional and interpersonal structures. An examination of the techniques 
in vogue, and the tactical gains which such techniques allow, will 
occupy the remaining portion of this essay. 
IV 
Before 1939, the forms and content of ethnic and political express-
ion were, like the social and economic structures of the region, of the 
type that one might expect to encounter in an essentially modern indus-
trial society. Ethnic identity did draw on ancient images and, as is 
the case with most cultural revivals, contained a mixture of antiquarian, 
contemporary, and progressive themes. Nevertheless, it would be wrong 
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to view Catalans as an ethnic group operating in a traditional context· 
What strikes the observer is the organized quality of Catalan ethnic 
life prior to 1939, the interest in politics and the range of political 
parties, the educational institutions, and the cultural-ethnic associa-
tions which flourished during the first four decades of the present 
century. 
Some ethnic groups are aided in the maintenance of their identity 
by reason of isolation or dependence upon a given environment (Barth 
1969:19; Blom 1969), but no such factors are discernible in present-day 
Catalonia. Even the concept of the Catalans as a strictly geographic 
enclave is hardly warranted. As already noted, many non-Catalans re-
side within the geographic confines of Catalonia, also, substantial 
Catalan communities are to be found abroad, mostly in Western Europe 
and Latin America. 
Ethnicity for Catalans is above all a matter of ascription and 
identification: one is a Catalan because one feels oneself to be and is 
recognized as such by other members of the ethnic group. Outsiders, 
both foreigners and in some instances even non-Catalan nationals, are 
hard put to recognize the full range of cultural codes which Catalans 
utilize to signal group membership. In part, this is a function of 
the t'low profile" which Catalans maintain with respect to acti vi ties 
of an ethnic-nationalist nature, but it is also evidence of the fact 
that Catalans have for centuries formed part of the larger social, 
political and economic structures which constitute Spain. 
These common cultural attributes hinder the identification of re-
gional traits and patterns, but more than this, the appearance of 
commonality is reinforced by externally imposed regulations which limit 
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or prohibit some of the standard expressions of cultural difference. 
We have already commented on the control of the mass media. In much the 
same way, street names and advertis ements, and virtually all those 
highly visible indicators that one tends to associate with a distinct 
cultural and linguistic tradition in a complex society, are rendered in 
Castilian. If we add to this the observation that Catalans will almost 
automatically address the obvious stranger in Castilian, it is not 
surprising that many foreigners can traverse the length of Catalonia 
wi thout becoming aware that the natives regard themselves as d.istinct 
from other Spaniards. 
It is nevertheless possible to distinguish at least three levels 
or modes of cultural affirmation. The first is essentially symbolic 
and involves the individual use of recognized cultural idioms. The 
second entails a more formal organizational commitment--working with 
others--but typically the ethnic-political aims of such groups are not 
readily apparent. Finally, there are organizations that operate under-
ground and are legally proscribed. I will deal only with the first two 
categories since they have greater currency and there arise some obvious 
ethical questions that limit discussion of the third. 
An individual may express his ethnic identity in a multitude of ways. 
Speaking Catalan, reading Catalan books, and listening to Catalan records 
are in themselves affirmations of ethnicity. Many middle-class Catalans 
not only make it a point to speak the language, but support their actions 
by citing inconsistencies in the current situation. For example, quite 
a few informants were aware that Spain is a signatory of the United 
Nations Charter, the Universal Decl~ation of Human Rights, and the 1960 
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UNESCO Convention on discrimination in education. Each of these in-
struments has some bearing on language use and broader questions of 
cultural pluralism and the protection of minority rights. In somewhat 
the same category fall the efforts that have been made to exploit the 
Vatican guidelines on the use of the vernacular in religious observances 
and other activities. Most often cited are the recommendations of 
Vatican II and the Papal encyclical Pacem in terris. 
Religion also offers a number of visual signals that carry an ethnic 
message, such as medals or medallions featuring St. George, patron of 
Catalonia, or the Virgin on Montserrat, a shrine closely associated with 
ethnic aspirations. More obvious are jewelry items and decals elaborated 
around the Catalan flag. At times affirmations of this kind are carried 
off with a certain wry humor, as in the case of a taxi driver who had 
affixed a notice to the back of the front seat informing the passenger: 
"I speak French and German," and in much larger type, "I ALSO SPEAK 
CATALAN." 
Before examining groups and associations that engage in activities 
designed to further ethnic goals, some further elaboration on the Cata-
lan middle class and the patterns of interaction of its members is in 
order. The reader will bear in mind that it is from this social stratum 
that most of the field information for this essay is derived. Although 
we have previously stressed that Catalans are group-oriented--they share 
with Americans a certain propensity to be "joiners "--the local middle 
class lends itself beautifully to the operation of linkages of a less 
formal kind, what have been variously described as networks, quasi 
groups, action-sets, and cliques (Mayer 1966; Barnes 1954; Frankenberg 
1966: 242; Wolf 1966: 15). Coalitions of this sort are more loosely 
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structured and are functionally less specific than entities designed 
for a particular purpose. 
Catalonia is a society with a small and relatively homogenous elite 
inhabiting a circumscribed physical and social space. Under such con-
ditions a village-like situation arises--I have heard Barcelona referred 
to as a II small hankerchief"--that mitigates against anonymity and makes 
it possible for almost everyone to know everyone else. In the case of 
strangers from within the middle class it is generally the work of min-
utes to establish common ground on the basis of a third person known to 
both individuals. 
A number of standard mechanisms are used in establishing affinity: 
family name and kin (facilitated by the Spanish system of using both 
patronym and matronym); region of origin; school and university experience; 
profession and professional associations. Virtually all middle-class 
Catalans have attended private secondary schools and the vast majority 
of university graduates have been trained at the University of Barcelona. 
Needless to say, such networks lend themselves to a variety of uses 
and functions, for instance, brokerage and patronage, which fall outside 
the s cope of our present consideration (Wolf 1956; Adams 1970). At the 
same time, though, they offer an interrelational field within which ex-
pression and discussion may be conducted with few fears of outside inter-
vention. I could not escape the impression that the very difficulties 
inherent in establishing and maintaining associations of a more formal 
(I\' 
nature has led to a situation in which much activity bearing on ethnicity 
and nationalism takes place in loosely structured, sometimes ad hoc, net-
works and cliques. Formal groups are easier to identity and public 
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meetings require official permits, although this stipulation can be 
circumvented in a number of ways. But, to cite one example, it is 
simply not feasible for the authorities to regulate something like the 
traditional ~nya, the weekly informal get-together held at some bar 
or restaurant. The penya has a fairly flexible membership, say a dozen 
individuals, typically all males. Apart from the congeniality of eating 
and drinking, exchanging gossip and catching up with the news, the penya 
provides an excellent forum for political discussion. Since everyone 
knows everyone else, or at least each individual has established firm 
bona fides, the atmosphere is relaxed and talk is spirited. 
Catalan ethnic identity is also maintained through more formal 
channels. The trick is to develop groups and associations able to skirt 
the regulations limiting rights of assembly. Typical of such entities 
are outing and excursion clubs, folk dange and folk song groups, cinema 
clubs, and alumnae associations. All such collectivities have one char-
acteristic in common: there is considerable disparity between purported 
functions and actual aims. Thus, a cinema group may be established for 
the apparent purpose of showing movies, and in fact, movies are shown; 
but following the presentation there is a period of discussion, and 
since "discussion" is broadly interpreted, it is likely to range far 
beyond cinematographic techniques and the talents of the actors. The 
over-all approach has been described as follows: 
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The gambit with us has always been the same: take 
measures and approaches that are very modest and 
legal and build on them. What we say is this: 
"Tread carefully so as not to scare the hare, then 
catch it before it wakes!" Once we have our foot 
in the door it is too late for the authorities to 
do much about it. Thus with song, our big break 
- ---- ---- - - --- - - - ----------- ---
came when Raimon [a leading Catalan folk singer] 
won the first prize at the Mediterranean Song 
Festival [Barcelona 1967]. The authorities 
suddenly reali zed 'That was going on) but they had 
lost the game. They then tried to apply pressure 
and make life difficult for us, but one is never 
pushed back all the way. And, of course, as soon 
as performers are known outside the country they 
develop a certain international following and thus 
a degree of immunity. 
The Catholic Church in Catalonia is difficult to categorize, but one 
thing is certain: it is not monolithic, either in attitude or organization. 
At the risk of simplification, we can say that it includes a conservative-
traditional (even reactionary) component basically in agreement with the 
regime, a more progressive wing drawing its inspiration from Christian 
Democracy and related movements, and an element in tune with the new wave 
of radical Catholicism that is presently so much in evidence throughout 
Western Europe, Latin America, and the United States. This division, which 
barely sketches out the diversity of opinion within the church, is not, of 
course, limited to Catalonia, but may be found throughout Spain. 
Within Catalonia, though, the progressive components, made up mostly 
of the younger clergy , but including also some established churchmen, 
have strongly supported regional aspirations. Since the end of the Civil 
War, the Monastery of Montserrat has been a focal point of resistance and 
an enduring symbol of local independence. In the years immediately follow-
ing the Civil War, when the possibilities of cultural and political ex-
pression were really limited, many Catalans made the pilgrimage to Mont-
serrat where the monks openly defied the ban on the use of the Catalan 
language in the pulpit. 
The authorities have at times strongly reacted to such manifesta-
tions of ethnic and political opposition . Priests and monks have been 
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exiled and imprisoned and on May 11, 1966, the Policia Armada (a national 
gendarmerie) attacked a silent march of 130 priests and monks which was 
making its way from the Cathedral of Barcelona to police headquarters in 
order to deliver a letter of protest concerning police brutality (Anon. 
1966) . 
Still, and taking into account the very evident dangers of opposi-
tion, the church does fall outside the normal areas of government control 
and consequently constitutes a kind of privileged sanctuary. As a case 
in point, there are some twenty associations of the lay apostolate in 
Catalonia, associations recruited from a local base and catering to local 
needs. Similarly, the greater freedom of church-related organizations 
from government censorship and other forms of interference has made 
possible the pUblication of books and magazines of a kind which no pri-
vate publishing house would dare to print. 
The use of religious organizations in the furtherance of ethnic and 
political demands is a variant of the technique examined earlier in this 
section. There is little doubt that everyone understands what is being 
done, but the regime, which in part bases its claim to legitimacy on a 
supposed defense of Catholic Christianity, must tread with some care 
when faced with an opposition that can quote the pope and work within 
the context of established and recognized ecclesiastical organizations. 
The mechanisms which we have described so far all have a direct 
bearing on ethnic identity. The ethnic factor may not always be readily 
evident, in fact it may be subsumed or hidden rather than manifest for 
the very good reason that direct expressions of ethnicity carry the 
danger of repression. But having stripped away such protective coloration, 
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the message is clear. Very different, and even harder to recognize with-
out some knowledge of local sentiments, is a phenomenon of displacement 
or identification that leads Catalans to champion the causes of minority 
groups other than their own. 
There are two non-Catalan groups, the Basques and the Israelis (and 
by extension Jews in general), that seem to enjoy a psychological special 
relationship in Catalonia. That the Basques are admired should come as 
no surprise, but an understanding of the admiration that is felt for Jews 
and Israelis is initially more puzzling. 
Again and again this past summer (1970) informants expressed the 
deepest regard for Israel and vocally identified with the Jewish exper-
ience of suffering and persecution, cultural revitalization, and eventual 
success in the face of great odds. In contrast to this, Spanish official 
policy is strongly pro-Arab. The regime does not maintain full diplo-
matic relations with Israel (no links at the ambassadorial level), but 
ambassadors are accredited to every major Arab capital. Reactions to 
the Six Day War cast further light on Catalan attitudes and the gulf 
separating these attitudes from official government policy. While the 
Spanish press, no doubt following official guidelines, was generally 
hostile to Israel, two hundred Catalan intellectuals issued a signed 
manifesto supporting the Israeli cause. 
Strong pro-Israeli feelings are especially marked among the young 
who, unlike a number of their American age mates, seem to have been 
little influenced by the mystique of Palestinian guerrillas. In a region 
where the Israelis lack anything in the way of a natural constituency--
there are but a few thousand native-born Jews in all Catalonia--it is 
surprising to find so many young men and women who dance the hora, sing 
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Hebrew songs, evidence more than a casual knowledge of Israeli culture, 
and consume a steady stream of literature with Jewish and Israeli 
. 6 
themes. Basques and Israelis are not the only two nationalities or 
ethnic groups that find emotional support in Catalonia, but they are 
the two most favored, the two most respected. 
Taken together, all these techniques of resistance add up to hold-
ing actions, or at the best, tactical victories of a largely symbolic 
form--an affirmation that "something is being done." Responses of this 
kind are typical of situations where the organizations of a subordinate 
group have been proscribed, and where militant (or too overt) activity 
by the subordinate group is kept in check by force or threat of force. 
The cultural codes used to assert ethnic difference and political 
opposition, the two being virtually synonymous, are well understood with-
in the subordinate group, and to some degree at least, by the agents of 
state authority. The options open to the authorities are, however, 
limited by either the diffuseness of the target or by the nature of the 
terrain that the subordiante group has elected to fight on. 
The very difficulties inherent in establishing formal organizations 
of resistance have, I believe, mitigated against the dangers of faction-
alism and rigidity. There has been a scaling down of ethnic-national 
activity to the level of symbolic action and forms of expression likely 
to have the broadest regional appeal. While my data does not allow me 
to generalize for all components of the Catalan population, my impress-
ion is that such a scaling down has helped to bridge social divisions 
(class, occupational, rural-urban, generational, etc.) and forced indiv-
iduals to concentrate on a fee fundamentals such as freedom of linguistic 
134 
-------------------------- _._---- . 
and cultural expression and a return to democratic forms of government. 
This leaves for the future such potentially thornier questions as the 
exact nature of the social and economic system to be achieved following 
the demise of the present regime. Similarly, while it is possible for 
Catalans to discuss the kind of relationships and links that a democratic 
Catalonia should have with (or within) a democratic Spain, the formula-
tion of concrete alternatives can await the time when the Spanish people 
as a whole are once again in a position to make their will known. 
Turning specifically to the Catalan middle class, organizational 
limitations are compensated for by the smallness of scale of the society. 
In such societies, role relationships tend to be particularistic rather 
than universalistic. The smallness of the social field means that there 
is a good deal of overlap, that many roles are played by relatively few 
individuals. In turn, this means that there is a good deal of on-going 
contact and that. consequently formal structures can to some degree be 
dispensed with (Gluckman 1955: 18-19; Firth 1951: 47; Parsons 1951; 
Benedict 1966: 25-27). In part by necessity, and in part by the nature 
of the social structure, we have a kind of village pump society writ 
large. This too, has some obvious advantages under the present con-
ditions since it assures communication, the exchange of views and 
opinions, adjustment and compromise; in short, substantial flexibility. 
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NOTES 
1 This paper is based on the sources cited and on information 
gathered in the course of my own field work in Catalonia during the 
summer of 1970. It should be understood that while I interviewed in-
formants drawn from different walks of life, most of my contacts were 
with middle-class Catalans resident in Barcelona. Field research 
was financed by a grant from the National Institute of Mental Health. 
This assistance has made possible the present report as well as re-
lated research now in preparation. 
2 The concept of absolutism developed together with the modern 
idea of political sovereignty, two facets of an ideology of power con-
centration. In concrete terms, this implied that over every indiv-
idual and over every piece of territory there should be but one 
undisputed authority with the right to compel uniformity by sanction 
or threat of sanction. This claim was even extended to the religious 
field where the principle was formulated as cujus regio, ejus religio, 
the right of princes to determine the religion of their subjects. As 
with other ideologies at other times, this one found support in the 
writings of contemporary philosophers. Jean Bodin's De la Republique 
(1576) and Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan (1651) are prime examples of the 
genre. Books II and V of that handbook on statecraft, Niccolo Machia-
velli's 11 principe (1532), can be read as an early statement of ab-
solutist and centralist principles. 
3 This figure is based on estimates of language use. While Cata-
lan is one language, three mutually understandable dialects are spoken 
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in Spain: Catalan as spoken in Catalonia proper (often regarded as "stan-
dard Catalan"); Catalan as spoken in Valencia (valencia); and the Catalan 
used in the Balearic Islands, termed mallorqul after the largest island 
of the group. These dialectic differences are not without current poli-
tical relevance. The semiofficial Instituto Nacional del Libro Espanol 
(INLE) breaks down the statistics of books published in Catalan into the 
three dialect categories giving to each the value of a language designa-
tion (in Castilian: lengua catalana, lengua valenciana, and lengua mallor-
quina), thus ignoring the basic unity of the Catalan language (Vallverdu 
1970a: 51-52). On the position of valencia and the cultural and linguis-
tic pressures faced by the people of Valencia see Lluls V. Aracil's A 
Valencian Dilemma (1966). Catalan is also spoken in Andorra, where it 
enjoys the status of an official language, and across the Pyrenees in 
Rousillon, today the French Department of Pyrenees-Orientales. 
4For a review of the literature on population and immigration in 
Catalonia see Boix Selva (1967). Botella (1968) has written a short 
survey on recent demographic trends in Catalonia. Two articles (Alzina 
Caules 1966; Aramburo Campoy 1966) tackle the more specific questions of 
population and migratory movements in Barcelona. For census data, both 
national and regional, consult the national census published every ten 
years and the Anuario Estadlstico de Espana issued yearly, both are 
published by the Instituto Nacional de Estadlstica. As might be expected, 
immigrants from other parts of Spain (and earlier from rural Catalonia) 
have been especially drawn to Barcelona and its satellite industrial 
towns. Immigrants, and children of immigrants (individuals of non-Catalan 
origin) today make up about half of greater Barcelona's almost two mil-
lion inhabitants. This immigrant population is composed of two distinct 
entities: 
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1. A component, almost entirely of peasant and small 
town background, drawn mainly from the most im-
poverished regions of Spain: the south (Extremadura, 
Andalucla), the central meseta, and Galicia in the 
northwest. When Catalans refer to "immigrants" it 
is this element they have in mind. 
2. A much smaller, but socio-culturally very important, 
group recruited from the Spanish national elite. Its 
links are not to regions and localities (although 
madrilenos seem well-represented), but to the national 
power s truct ure . 
Working- and lower-class immigrants are concentrated in the poor 
neighborhoods near the port and in the industrial suburbs which ring 
Barcelona. The Castilian-speaking bureaucrats, military, professionals 
and businessmen reside in middle-class districts throughout the city. 
They form part of, and strongly identity with, Spanish national culture. 
Little research has been done on either group. My impression is that 
contacts between middle-class Catalans and middle-class Castilians tend 
to be limited to work-related situations. The poorer immigrants war-
rant a major research effort. Their move to the city is typically a 
permanent shift in residence and their modes of adaptation and the 
reception which they encounter should be studied in depth. One aspect 
of. immigrant ex;perience ...... the conditions of life of the most impoverish-
ed elements--has been examined with sensitivity and understanding in 
two books by the Valencian author Francese Candel, Donde la ciudad 
cambia 9U nombre (1957), a novel, and Els altres catalans (1964), a 
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piece of descriptive journalism. Badia i Margarit (1969) has conducted 
a very detailed study of language use in Barcelona. While this research 
gives us ample information on language distribution and bilingualism in 
different Barcelona districts, the work is descriptive rather than ana-
lytical. A second volume, now in preparation in devoted to analysis and 
interpretation of language use patterns. 
5 In many respects, the Catalan bourgeoisie evidenced a kind of 
delayed political development. In the early decades of the present cen-
tury, it appears that idologically they shared more in common with poli-
tical movements typical of small enclave nationalities, such as Slovaks 
and Croatians, than with the tides of political thinking then running in 
some of the larger European countries. During the nineteen twenties and 
thirties, the indu?trial directing classes stressed regional values and 
rejected theories of state intervention in the economy, preferring instead 
to place their faith on a combination of free market operation (within 
Spain) and the support of personal liberties. A major consequence of this 
orientation was that on the whole the Catalan bourgeoisie were little 
attracted to Fascism and similar ideologies giving to the state a major 
role in the economy and other areas of national life. On the other hand, 
some of the solutions proposed for coping with social and economic prob-
lems seem hardly realistic. Thus, as late as 1931, when Catalan industry 
was experiencing the full impact of the depression, the platform of the 
major liberal party in Catalonia seriously proposed a program of return 
to the land in the belief that re-ruralization would not only ease un-
employment, but be in keeping with an image if society that saw an in-
dependent peasantry as the foundation of Catalan tradition (Pinilla de 
las Heras 1968: 153). 
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6 This may not be a phenomenon limited to Catalonia. I noted with 
interest (New York Times, December 3, 1970) that among the books seized 
by the Spanish police in the apartment of an arrested Basque nationalist 
there figured Leon Uris' Mila 18, a novel about the Warsaw ghetto up-
rising. 
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